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Abstract
Intuitionistic dependence logic was introduced by Abramsky and Va¨a¨na¨nen
[1] as a variant of dependence logic under a general construction of Hodges’
(trump) team semantics. It was proven that there is a translation from intu-
itionistic dependence logic sentences into second order logic sentences. In
this paper, we prove that the other direction is also true, therefore intuition-
istic dependence logic is equivalent to second order logic on the level of
sentences.
1 Introduction
Dependence Logic (D), as a new approach to independence friendly logic (IF-
logic) [4], was introduced in [12]. Hodges gave a compositional semantics for
IF-logic in [5], [6], trump semantics (or team semantics). Recent research by
Abramsky, Va¨a¨na¨nen [1] generalized Hodges’ construction for team semantics (or
trump semantics) and introduced BID-logic, which extends dependence logic and
includes both intuitionistic implication and linear implication, as well as intuition-
istic disjunction. We call the intuitionistic fragment of BID-logic “intuitionistic
dependence logic (ID)”. In this paper, we study the expressive power of sentences
of intuitionistic dependence logic. By the method of [3] and [13], we know that
sentences of D have exactly the same expressive power as sentences of Σ11, the
existential second order fragment. It was proven in [1] that ID sentences are ex-
pressible in second-order logic (SO). We will show that the other direction is also
true; that is, there is a translation from the sentences of the full SO into ID. In
particular, D sentences (or Σ11 sentences) are expressible in ID. This means that ID
is so powerful that it is equivalent to the full SO on the level of sentences.
∗This work is part of the European Science Foundation EUROCORES LogICCC project Logic
for Interaction (LINT). The research leading to the current article was supported by the Finnish
National Graduate School in Mathematics and its Applications.
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We name the logic under discussion “intuitionistic” dependence logic, because
the implication of this logic satisfies the axioms of the usual intuitionistic implica-
tion. As we know, the usual intuitionistic logic (either propositional or first-order)
is weaker than classical logic (see e.g. [2]). However, although the idea of intro-
ducing the intuitionistic implication in the general context of Hodges’ construction
is very natural, as the above-mentioned result of this paper shows, in the team se-
mantics context, ID is stronger than (classical) D. It is worthwhile to point out that
restricted to (classical) first-order formulas (or flat formulas), ID is in fact classi-
cal. It is only between rednon-classical formulas (dependence formulas) that the
intuitionistic implication does play a role.
Another logic in the team semantics setting with the same expressive power
as the full second order logic is the so-called team logic, which is the logic of
dependence logic extended with classical negation (see [12] and also [9], [7]). The
significance of intuitionistic dependence logic is that the equivalence of ID and
the full SO on the sentence level is established without the presence of the logical
connective classical negation.
Throughout the paper, we assume readers are familiar with the standard Tarskian
semantics of first-order logic and the standard semantics of second-order logic. We
assume that the domain of a first-order model M is non-empty. For any model M ,
an assignment s on M is a function from a finite set dom(s) of variables into the
domain of M (dom(s) will be always clear from the context). Let a be an ele-
ment in M , and x a variable in dom(s). We write s(a/x) for the assignment with
dom(s(a/x)) = dom(s)∪{x} which agrees with s everywhere except that it maps
x to a. The sequences of variables 〈xi,1, . . . ,xi,n〉 and 〈xi1, . . . ,xin〉 with subscripts
and superscripts are abbreviated as xi and xi, respectively. Similarly for sequences
of constants and elements of models. For any assignment s for x, we write s(x)
for the sequence 〈s(x1), . . . ,s(xn)〉. We use the standard abbreviation ∀x to stand
for a sequence of universal quantifiers ∀x1 . . .∀xn (the length of x is always clear
from the context or does not matter); similarly for existential quantifiers.
2 Intuitionistic Dependence Logic as a Fragment of BID-
logic
In this section, we define intuitionistic dependence logic, which is the intuitionistic
fragment of BID-logic introduced in [1]. We will also recall some basic properties
of dependence logic proved in [12] in this general framework.
BID-logic is obtained from a general construction of Hodges’ team semantics
(or trump semantics) [5], [6]. Well-formed formulas of BID-logic (in negation
normal form) are given by the following grammar
φ ::=α |=(t1, . . . , tn) | ¬=(t1, . . . , tn) | ⊥ | φ∧φ | φ⊗φ | φ>φ |
φ→ φ | φ⊸ φ | ∀xφ | ∃xφ
where α is a first-order atomic or negated atomic formula (first-order literal), t1, . . . , tn
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are terms. Formulas of the form =(t1, . . . , tn) are called dependence atomic formu-
las or dependence atoms. The disjunctions “⊗” and “>” are called split disjunction
and intuitionistic disjunction, the implications “→” and “⊸” are called intuitionis-
tic implication and linear implication, respectively. The set Fv(φ) of free variables
of a formula φ of BID-logic is defined in the standard way except for the case of
dependence atoms:
Fv(=(t1, . . . , tn)) = V ar(t1)∪ ·· ·∪V ar(tn),
where V ar(ti) (1 ≤ i ≤ n) is the set of variables occurring in ti. We call φ a
sentence in case Fv(φ) = /0.
For the semantics for BID-logic, we adopt and generalize Hodges’ team seman-
tics. For any model M , a team X of M is a set of assignments on M with the same
domain dom(X). We define two operations on teams. For any team X of M , and
any function F : X →M , the supplement team X(F/x) = {s(F (s)/x) : s ∈X}
and the duplicate team X(M/x) = {s(a/x) : a ∈M, s ∈ X}. Now we give the
team semantics for BID-logic. For any suitable model M and any team X of M
whose domain includes the set of free variables of the formula under discussion,
• M |=X α with α first-order literal iff for all s ∈ X, M |=s α in the usual
Tarskian semantics sense;
• M |=X=(t1, . . . , tn) iff for all s,s′ ∈ X with s(t1) = s′(t1),. . . , s(tn−1) =
s′(tn−1), it holds that s(tn) = s′(tn);
• M |=X ¬=(t1, . . . , tn) iff X = /0;
• M |=X ⊥ iff X = /0;
• M |=X φ∧ψ iff M |=X φ and M |=X ψ;
• M |=X φ⊗ψ iff there exist teams Y,Z ⊆ X with X = Y ∪Z such that
M |=Y φ and M |=Z ψ;
• M |=X φ>ψ iff M |=X φ or M |=X ψ;
• M |=X φ→ ψ iff for any team Y ⊆X, if M |=Y φ then M |=Y ψ;
• M |=X φ⊸ψ iff for any team Y with dom(Y ) = dom(X), ifM |=Y φ then
M |=X∪Y ψ;
• M |=X ∃xφ iff M |=X(F/x) φ for some function F : X→M ;
• M |=X ∀xφ iff M |=X(M/x) φ.
We say that a formula φ is satisfied by a team X in a model M , if M |=X φ holds.
It can be easily shown that satisfaction of a formula of BID-logic depends only on
the interpretations of the variables occurring free in the formula. Sentences have
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no free variable and there is only one assignment with empty domain, namely the
empty assignment /0. We say that a sentence φ is true in M if the team { /0} of
empty assignment satisfies φ, i.e. M |={ /0} φ. We use the standard notation φ |= ψ
to mean that for any suitable model M , M |= φ implies M |= ψ.
The intuitionistic implication and linear implication are adjoints of the corre-
sponding conjunctions; that is
φ∧ψ |= χ⇐⇒ φ |= ψ→ χ,
φ⊗ψ |= χ⇐⇒ φ |= ψ⊸ χ.
The propositional variant of BID-logic without dependence formulas is essentially
the BI logic, the “logic of Bunched Implications” introduced in [10], [11]. The
fragment with connectives ∧, ⊗ and quantifiers is the usual dependence logic,
where as pointed out in [1], ⊗ is in fact the multiplicative conjunction instead of
disjunction (therefore the notation “⊗”). The intuitionistic fragment of BID-logic
is called intuitionistic dependence logic. More precisely, well-formed formulas of
D are formed by the following grammar
φ ::= α |=(t1, . . . , tn) | ¬=(t1, . . . , tn) | φ∧φ | φ⊗φ | ∀xφ | ∃xφ
where α is a first-order literal and t1, . . . , tn are terms. Well-formed formulas of ID
are formed by the following grammar
φ ::= α |=(t) | ⊥ | φ∧φ | φ>φ | φ→ φ | ∀xφ | ∃xφ
where α is a first-order atomic formula and t is a term. Note that the dependence
atoms of ID have only single terms and M |=X=(t) means intuitively that t be-
haves in team X as a constant. We will see later in Lemma 3.1 that dependence
atom with several variables =(t1, . . . , tn) is definable by the constancy dependence
atoms =(ti).
The most important property of BID-logic is the downwards closure property
that for any formula φ, if M |=X φ and Y ⊆X, then M |=Y φ. A formula φ is said
to be flat if for all suitable models M and teams X
M |=X φ⇐⇒ (M |={s} φ for all s ∈X).
We call the D formulas with no occurrence of dependence subformulas (clas-
sical) first-order formulas (of BID-logic), that is first-order formulas of BID-logic
are formulas with only first-order literals, ∧, ⊗, ∀x and ∃x. Throughout the paper,
we sometimes talk about first-order formulas of BID-logic and the usual first-order
formulas at the same time, in such cases, we identify the first-order connective ⊗
of BID-logic with the usual first-order connective ∨.
Lemma 2.1. First-order formulas are flat.
Proof. Easy, by induction on the structure of formulas.
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Lemma 2.2. Sentences of BID-logic are flat.
Proof. To evaluate sentences with no free variables, we only consider the singleton
team { /0} of the empty assignment /0.
It is easy to observe that D and ID have the empty team property, that is for
any D or ID formula φ, any model M , the empty team satisfies φ, i.e. M |= /0 φ.
However, the full BID-logic does not have such property. For example, for any
model M , M 6|= /0 (x= x)⊸ (x 6= x).
3 First-order Formulas are Expressible in Intuitionistic
Dependence Logic
In this section, we show that every first-order formula (of BID-logic) is logically
equivalent to a formula in intuitionistic dependence logic. Two formulas φ and ψ
of BID-logic are said to be logically equivalent to each other, in symbols φ≡ ψ, if
for any suitable model M and team X with dom(X) ⊇ Fv(φ)∪Fv(ψ), it holds
that
M |=X φ⇐⇒M |=X ψ.
Lemma 3.1. We have the following logical equivalences in BID-logic:
(1) =(t1, . . . , tn) ≡=(t1)∧ ·· ·∧=(tn−1)→=(tn) for any terms t1, . . . , tn;
(2) ¬φ ≡ φ→⊥ whenever φ is an atom (first-order or dependence atom);
(3) (φ→⊥)→⊥ ≡ φ whenever φ is a flat formula;
(4) φ⊗ψ ≡ (φ→⊥)→ ψ whenever both φ and ψ are flat formulas.
Proof. Items (1)-(3) can be proved easily. We only show item (4). That is to show
that for any model M and any team X with dom(X) ⊇ Fv(φ)∪Fv(ψ) it holds
that
M |=X φ⊗ψ⇐⇒M |=X (φ→⊥)→ ψ.
=⇒: Suppose M |=X φ⊗ψ. Then there exist two teams Y,Z with X = Y ∪Z
such that M |=Y φ and M |=Z ψ. For any nonempty U ⊆X with M |=U φ→⊥,
downwards closure gives that for any s∈U ,M |={s} φ→⊥, i.e. M 6|={s} φ. Since
M |=Y φ, in view of the downwards closure we conclude that s 6∈ Y , thus U ⊆ Z ,
which implies M |=U ψ by downwards closure.
⇐=: Suppose M |=X (φ→⊥)→ ψ. Define
Y = {s ∈X |M |={s} φ} and Z = {s ∈X |M 6|={s} φ}.
Clearly, X = Y ∪Z . If Z 6= /0, then for any s ∈ Z ⊆ X, we have that M |={s}
φ→⊥, thus since M |={s} (φ→⊥)→ ψ, we obtain that M |={s} ψ. Now both
M |=Y φ and M |=Z ψ follow from the flatness of φ and ψ.
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Remark 3.2. Item (2) of the above lemma shows that for atomic formulas, de-
pendence negation and intuitionistic negation have the same meaning. Moreover,
restricted to singleton teams, the connectives → and > of ID behave as classical
connectives. To determine whether a flat formula is satisfied by a team X, one in
fact only needs to consider the satisfaction of singleton subteams of X, for which
the intuitionistic negation behaves classically. This explains why items (3), (4)
hold.
Next we define expressibility.
Definition 3.3. Let L be a sublogic of BID-logic. We say that a formula φ of
BID-logic is expressible in L , if there exists an L formula ψ such that φ≡ ψ.
Theorem 3.4. First-order formulas (of BID-logic) are expressible in ID.
Proof. Assuming that every first-order formula is in prenex normal form and the
negation-free part is in conjunctive normal form, the theorem follows immediately
from items (2), (4) of Lemma 3.1.
For example, the quantifier-free first-order formula (α⊗ (¬β⊗γ))∧ δ in con-
junctive normal form, where α,β,γ,δ are first-order atoms, can be translated into
ID as follows:
(α⊗ (¬β⊗γ))∧ δ =⇒ ((α→⊥)→ (¬β⊗γ))∧ δ
=⇒ ((α→⊥)→ ((¬β→⊥)→ γ))∧ δ
=⇒ ((α→⊥)→ (((β→⊥)→⊥)→ γ))∧ δ.
4 Sentences of Dependence Logic and Σ11 are Expressible
in Intuitionistic Dependence Logic
It follows from [3] and [13] that IF-logic is equivalent to the Σ11 fragment of SO
on the level of sentences. Dependence logic, which is equivalent to IF-logic on
the level of sentences is therefore also equivalent to the Σ11 fragment. Va¨a¨na¨nen in
[12] gave a direct translation from one logic into the other. In this section, we will
prove that there exists a translation from sentences of D or Σ11 sentences into ID.
This proof will be generalized in Section 5 to the full second-order logic.
Definition 4.1. Let LSO and LBID be sublogics of second-order logic and of BID-
logic, respectively.
1. We say that a sentence φ of LBID is expressible in LSO, if there exists an
LSO sentence ψ such that for any suitable model M ,
M |= ψ⇐⇒M |={ /0} φ.
6
2. We say that a sentence ψ of LSO is expressible in LBID, if there exists an
LBID sentence φ such that for any suitable model M ,
M |= ψ⇐⇒M |={ /0} φ.
Theorem 4.2 ([12]). D sentences are expressible in the Σ11 fragment of SO.
We sketch the proof of the next theorem. In the next section, we will generalize
the translation in the next theorem to translate all second order sentences, first into
BID-logic, and in the end into ID.
Theorem 4.3 ([12]). Σ11 sentences are expressible in D.
Proof. (idea) Without loss of generality, we may assume every Σ11 sentence φ is of
the following special Skolem normal form
∃f1 . . .∃fn∀x1 . . .∀xmψ,
where ψ is quantifier-free and first-order, and for each 1≤ i≤ n, every occurrence
of the function symbol fi is of the same form fixi1 . . .xiq for some fixed sequence
〈xi1 , . . . ,xiq 〉 of variables from the set {x1, . . . ,xm}. We find a D sentence φ∗
which expresses φ. The idea behind the sentence φ∗ is that in φ, we replace each
occurrence of the function symbol fi by a new variable yi, and add a dependence
atom to specify that yi is functionally determined by the arguments xi1 , . . . ,xiq of
fi. This can be done because we have required that each occurrence of fi is of the
same form fixi1 . . .xiq . To be precise, the D sentence φ∗ is defined as follows:
φ∗ := ∀x1 . . .∀xm∃y1 . . .∃yn(=(x11 , . . . ,x1q ,y1)∧
·· ·∧=(xn1 , . . . ,xnq ,yn)∧ψ
′ ),
(1)
where ψ′ is obtained from ψ by replacing everywhere fixi1 . . .xiq by the new vari-
able yi for each 1≤ i≤n. In φ∗, the dependence atoms together with the existential
quantifiers enable us to pick exactly those functions corresponding to the functions
assigned to the existentially quantified function variables f1, . . . ,fn in φ.
Remark 4.4. Equation (1) with the first-order quantifier-free formula ψ′ in con-
junctive normal form is a normal form for D sentences.
Note that in the normal form (1) of a D sentence, the only subformulas that are
not in the language of ID are dependence atoms with several variables and first-
order quantifier-free formulas. As we have proved in the previous section, these
two kinds of formulas are both expressible in ID. Therefore we obtain the next
theorem.
Theorem 4.5. D sentences are expressible in ID.
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Proof. Let φ be a D sentence in the normal form (1). The ID sentence that ex-
presses φ is obtained by replacing the subformulas of the form =(xi,1, . . . ,xi,q,yi)
by the formula =(xi1)∧ ·· ·∧ =(xi,q)→=(yi) and the first-order quantifier-free
formula ψ′ by its equivalent ID formula obtained from Theorem 3.4.
Theorem 4.6. Σ11 sentences are expressible in ID.
Proof. Follows from Theorem 4.3 and Theorem 4.5.
Negation of dependence logic, as well as that of BID-logic do not satisfy Law
of Excluded Middle (neither for split disjunction nor for intuitionistic disjunction)
and are therefore not the classical negation. Dependence logic extended with clas-
sical negation (denoted by “∼”) is called team logic. Definable team properties
of team logic correspond exactly to all second order properties, in particular, sen-
tences of team logic have the same expressive power as sentences of the full second
order logic, see [12], [9], [7] for further discussions on team logic. The result of
the equivalence of ID and the full SO sentences to be presented in the next section
shows that ID, as a logic without classical negation, is actually equivalent to team
logic on the level of sentences. However, team logic and ID are not equivalent in
general, since for example, the classical negation of ⊥, denoted by ∼⊥, is a well-
formed formula in team logic, while in ID, it is not expressible. Indeed, suppose
the classical negation of ⊥ was expressible by an ID formula φ, namely for any
suitable model M and team X,
M 6|=X ⊥⇐⇒M |=X φ.
In particular, for empty team /0, it would hold that
M 6|= /0 ⊥⇐⇒M |= /0 φ,
but this is never the case since by the semantics M |= /0 ⊥ and by empty set property
of ID, M |= /0 φ always holds. This also shows that classical negation in general is
not definable in ID. However, for sentences of ID, as shown in the next lemma, the
intuitionistic negation does give a certain kind of “classical” negation.
Lemma 4.7. For any sentence φ of BID-logic, we have that for any suitable model
M
M |={ /0} φ→⊥⇐⇒M 6|={ /0} φ.
Proof. Trivial.
A sentence of BID-logic has no free variables, thus it is said to be true if and
only if the team { /0} of the empty assignment (a singleton team) satisfies it. As
pointed out in Remark 3.2, when restricted to singleton teams, the semantics of ID
is in fact classical. This explains why such kind of “classical” negation is definable
in ID.
Using the intuitionistic (“classical”) negation for sentences, we are able to ex-
press Π11 sentences as well.
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Corollary 4.8. Π11 sentences are expressible in ID.
Proof. Let ψ be a Π11 sentence. Note that ψ is equivalent to ¬φ for some Σ11 sen-
tence φ. By Theorem 4.6, there exists an ID sentence φ∗ such that
M |= φ⇐⇒M |={ /0} φ
∗
for all suitable models M . Since φ∗ is a sentence, by Lemma 4.7, we have that
M |={ /0} φ
∗→⊥⇐⇒M 6|={ /0} φ
∗⇐⇒M 6|= φ⇐⇒M |= ¬φ⇐⇒M |= ψ,
thus φ∗→⊥ is the sentence of ID expressing ψ.
5 Second-order Sentences are Expressible in Intuitionis-
tic Dependence Logic
In this section, we will generalize the proofs of Theorem 4.3 and Theorem 4.6 to
show that sentences of the full SO are expressible in ID. Together with the result
of the next theorem, proved in [1], we will be able to conclude that the expressive
power of ID sentences is so strong that it is, in fact, equivalent to that of sentences
of the full SO.
Theorem 5.1 ([1]). ID sentences are expressible in second-order logic.
In order to proceed to the main theorem of this paper (Theorem 5.9), we first
recall the normal form of SO formulas.
Theorem 5.2. [Normal Form of SO] Every second order sentence is equivalent to
a formula of the form
∀f 1∃f 2 . . .∀f 2n−1∃f 2n∀xψ,
where ψ is quantifier-free, and we assume without loss of generality that for the
corresponding Q ∈ {∀,∃}, each Qf i =Qf i1 . . .Qf ip and each f ij is of arity q.
The basic idea of the translation for sentences of the full SO is generalized
from that of the proof of Theorem 4.3 for Σ11 sentences. For each SO sentence in a
special normal form (to be clarified in Lemma 5.5), we replace each function vari-
able by a new variable and specify the functionality of the new variable by adding
the corresponding dependence atoms. We have seen in the proof of Theorem 4.3
that dependence atoms together with existential quantifiers enable us to simulate
existentially quantified function variables; on the other hand, universally quantified
function variables can also be simulated using dependence atoms and intuitionistic
implications. In this way, we will be able to express all SO sentences in ID.
To make this idea work, we need to first turn every SO sentence φ into a bet-
ter normal form than the one in Theorem 5.2, that is we need to guarantee that
for each q-ary function variable f ij , every occurrence of f ij in φ is of the same
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form f ijxi,j1 . . .xi,jq for some fixed sequence 〈xi,j1 . . .xi,jq〉 of variables (this nor-
mal form is inspired by the Σ11 normal form in Theorem 4.3, see Section 6.3 in [12]
for detailed discussions). To this end, we need three lemmas.
The first lemma removes nesting of function symbols in a formula.
Lemma 5.3. Let φ(ft1 . . . tq) be any first-order formula, in which the q-ary func-
tion symbol f has an occurrence of the form ft1 . . . tq for some terms t1 . . . tq. Then
we have that
|= φ(ft1 . . . tq)↔∀x1 . . .∀xq((t1 = x1)∧ ·· ·∧ (tq = xq)→ φ(fx1 . . .xq)),
where x1, . . . ,xq are new variables and φ(fx1 . . .xq) is the formula obtained from
φ(ft1 . . . tq) by replacing everywhere ft1 . . . tq by fx1 . . .xq.
Proof. Easy.
The second lemma unifies the arguments of function symbols in a formula.
Lemma 5.4. Let φ(fx1 . . . xq,fy1 . . . yq) be a first-order formula, in which the q-
ary function symbol f has an occurrence of the form fx1 . . .xq and an occurrence
of the form fy1 . . . yq with {x1 . . .xq}∩{y1 . . . yq}= /0. Then we have that
|=∀x1 . . .∀xq∀y1 . . .∀yqφ(fx1 . . .xq,fy1 . . . yq)
↔∃g∀x1 . . .∀xq∀y1 . . .∀yq(φ(fx1 . . .xq,gy1 . . . yq)
∧ ((x1 = y1)∧ ·· ·∧ (xq = yq)→ (fx1 . . .xq = gy1 . . . yq))),
where φ(fx1 . . .xq,gy1 . . . yq) is the first-order formula obtained from the formula
φ(fx1 . . . ,xq,fy1 . . . yq) by replacing everywhere fy1 . . . yq by gy1 . . . yq.
Proof. Easy.
The next lemma gives a nice normal form for SO sentences.
Lemma 5.5. Every SO formula is equivalent to a formula φ of the form
∀f 11 . . .∀f
1
p∃f
2
1 . . .∃f
2
p . . . . . .∀f
2n−1
1 . . .∀f
2n−1
p ∃f
2n
1 . . .∃f
2n
p ∀x1 . . .∀xmψ,
where
• ψ is quantifier free;
• for each 1 ≤ i ≤ 2n and each 1 ≤ j ≤ p, every occurrence of the q-ary
function symbol f ij is of the same form f ijxi,j , where
xi,j = 〈xi,j1, . . . ,xi,jq〉
with {xi,j1, . . . ,xi,jq} ⊆ {x1, . . . ,xm}.
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Proof. By applying Lemma 5.3 and Lemma 5.4 several times and adding dummy
quantifiers to the SO formulas in the normal form described in Theorem 5.2.
The next lemma states that under the right valuations, the behavior of functions
can be simulated by new variables. This technical lemma will play a role in the
proof of Lemma 5.7.
Lemma 5.6. Let φ(f ,x) be any first-order quantifier-free formula with function
symbols f1, . . . ,fp, where every occurrences of each q-ary function symbol fj is of
the same form
fjxj1 . . .xjq ,
where {xj1 . . .xjq} ⊆ {x1, . . . ,xm}. Let (M,F ) be any suitable model with new
function symbols f1, . . . ,fp interpreted as F1, . . . ,Fp, respectively. Let y1, . . . ,yp
be new variables and s an assignment with domain
{x1, . . . ,xm,y1, . . . ,yp}
such that for all 1≤ j ≤ p,
s(yj) = Fj(s(xj1), . . . ,s(xjq)). (2)
Then
(M,F ,s(x)) |= φ(f ,x)⇐⇒M |={s} φ
′,
where φ′ is the first-order formula of BID-logic obtained from φ by replacing ev-
erywhere fjxj1 . . .xjq by yj for each 1 ≤ j ≤ p.
Proof. It is easy to show by induction that for any term t, s(t) = s(t′), where t′
is obtained from t by replacing everywhere fjxj1 . . . xjq by yj for each 1 ≤ j ≤ p.
Next, we show the lemma by induction on φ. The only interesting case is the case
that φ≡ ψ∨χ. In this case, we have that
(M,F ,s(x)) |= ψ∨χ⇐⇒(M,F ,s(x)) |= ψ or (M,F ,s(x)) |= χ
⇐⇒M |={s} ψ
′ or M |={s} χ
′
(by induction hypothesis)
⇐⇒M |={s} ψ
′⊗χ′1
(since {s}= {s}∪{s}= {s}∪ /0).
Now we are in a position to give the translation from SO sentences into ID. To
simplify notations, this will be done in two steps. In the first step (Lemma 5.7), for
each SO formula φ, we find an equivalent sentence φ∗ in BID-logic. The second
step (Theorem 5.8) will turn φ∗ finally into an equivalent ID sentence.
1Here, as mentioned in Section 2, we identify the connective disjunction “∨” in SO and the split
disjunction “⊗” in BID-logic.
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If x = 〈x1, . . . ,xn〉 is a sequence of variables, then we abbreviate the atomic
formula =(x1, . . . ,xn,y) as =(x,y). If X is a team of M , then the duplicate team
X(M/x1) . . . (M/xn) is abbreviated as X(M/x1, . . . ,xn).
Lemma 5.7. SO sentences are expressible in BID-logic.
Proof. Without loss of generality, we may assume that every SO sentence φ is of
the form described in Lemma 5.5. For each pair 〈i,j〉 (1≤ i≤ 2n, 1≤ j ≤ p), pick
a new variable ui,j not occurring in φ. We inductively define BID formulas δi for
2n≥ i≥ 1 as follows:
δ2n := ∃u2n,1 . . .∃u2n,p(Θ2n ∧ψ′),
for 2n > i≥ 1,
δi :=
{
Θi → δi+1, if i is odd;
∃ui,1 . . .∃ui,p(Θi∧ δi+1), if i is even,
where
Θi =
p∧
j=1
=(xi,j ,ui,j)
and ψ′ is the first-order formula obtained from ψ by replacing everywhere each
f ijx
i,j by ui,j . Let
φ∗ = ∀u1,1 . . .∀u1,p∀u3,1 . . .∀u3,p . . . . . .∀u2n−1,1 . . .∀u2n−1,p∀xδ1
[
i.e. φ∗ =∀u1,1 . . .∀u1,p∀u3,1 . . .∀u3,p . . . . . .∀u2n−1,1 . . .∀u2n−1,p∀x
(Θ1 →∃u2,1 . . .∃u2,p(Θ2∧ (Θ3 →∃u4,1 . . .∃u4,p(Θ4∧ ·· · · · ·
· · · · · · ∧ (Θ2n−1 →∃u2n,1 . . .∃u2n,p(Θ2n ∧ψ′ )) · · · · · ·))))︸ ︷︷ ︸
2n
]
.
The general idea behind the BID formula φ∗ is that the δi’s for i odd, simulate
the ∀f i’s, and the δi’s for i even, simulate the ∃f i’s in the SO sentence φ. The rest
of the proof is devoted to show that such sentence φ∗ does express the SO sentence
φ, i.e. to show that for any suitable model M it holds that
M |= φ⇐⇒M |={ /0} φ
∗.
“=⇒”: Suppose M |= φ. Then for any sequence of functions
F 11 , . . . ,F
1
p :M
q →M,
there exists a sequence of functions (depending on F 1)
F 21 (F 1 ), . . . ,F
2
p (F
1 ) :M q →M
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such that for any . . . . . . for any sequence of functions
F 2n−11 , . . . ,F
2n−1
p : M
q →M,
there exists a sequence of functions (depending on F 1,F 3 . . . ,F 2n−1 )
F 2n1 (F 1,...,F 2n−1), . . . ,F
2n
p (F
1,...,F 2n−1 ) : M q →M
such that
(M,F 1, . . . ,F 2n) |= ∀xψ(f 1, . . . ,f 2n ). (3)
Let Y1 be a nonempty subteam of
X = { /0}(M/u1,u3, . . . ,u2n−1,x)
such that M |=Y1 Θ1. It suffices to show that
M |=Y1 δ2, i.e. M |=Y1 ∃u2,1 . . .∃u2,q(Θ2∧ δ3). (4)
The team Y1 corresponds to a sequence of functions F 11 (Y1), . . . ,F 1p (Y1) :M q →
M defined as follows: for any 1≤ j ≤ p, and for some fixed a0 ∈M , let
F 1j (d) =
{
s(u1,j), if there exists s ∈ Y1 such that s(x1,j) = d;
a0 ∈M, otherwise.
Each F 1j is well-defined. Indeed, for any d ∈M q, any s,s′ ∈ Y1 such that
s(x1,j) = d= s′(x1,j),
since M |=Y1 =(x1,j,u1,j), we must have that
s(u1,j) = s
′(u1,j).
Now, using the functions F 21 (F 1), . . . ,F 2p (F 1), we define a sequence of functions
α2,1(F 21 ), . . . ,α2,p(F 2p) from the corresponding supplement teams of Y1 to M such
that the supplement team Y1(α2,1/u2,1) . . . (α2,p/u2,p) satisfies Θ2 ∧ δ3. For each
1 ≤ j ≤ p, define the function
α2,j : Y1(α2,1/u2,1) . . . (α2,j−1/u2,j−1)→M
corresponding to F 2j (F 1) by taking
α2,j(s) = F
2
j (s(x
2,j)).
Put
Y2 = Y1(α2,1/u2,1) . . . (α2,p/u2,p).
It suffices to show that M |=Y2 Θ2 and
M |=Y2 δ3, i.e. M |=Y2 Θ3 → δ4. (5)
The former is obvious by the definitions of Y2 and α2. To show the latter, repeat
the same argument and construction n− 1 times, and it then suffices to show that
for any nonempty subteams Y3 of Y2, Y5 of Y4, . . . , Y2n−1 of Y2n−2 such that
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M |=Y3 Θ3, M |=Y5 Θ5, . . . , M |=Y2n−1 Θ2n−1,
it holds that
M |=Y4 Θ4,M |=Y6 Θ6, . . . ,M |=Y2n Θ2n (6)
and M |=Y2n ψ′, where Y4,Y6 . . . ,Y2n are supplement teams defined in the same
way as above. Clause (6) follows immediately from the definitions of Y4,Y6, . . . ,Y2n
and α4,α6, . . .α2n. To show M |=Y2n ψ′, since ψ′ is flat (first-order), it suffices to
show M |={s} ψ′ hold for all s ∈ Y2n.
For the functions F 1(Y1),F 2(F 1), . . . ,F 2n−1(Y2n−1),F 2n(F 2n−1) obtained as above,
by (3) we have that
(M,F 1, . . . ,F 2n,s(x)) |= ψ(f 1, . . . ,f 2n,x).
Now, it follows from the definitions of F 1, . . . ,F 2n that condition (2) in Lemma
5.6 is satisfied for each F ij , hence, an application of Lemma 5.6 gives the desired
result that M |={s} ψ′.
“⇐=”: Suppose M |={ /0} φ∗. Then
M |=X Θ1 → δ2,
where
X = { /0}(M/u1,u3, . . . ,u2n−1,x).
Let F 11 , . . . ,F 1p : M q →M be an arbitrary sequence of functions. Take a subteam
Y1(F 1) of X which corresponds to these functions by putting
Y1 = {s ∈ { /0}(M/u1,u3 . . .u2n−1,x)
| s(u1,1) = F
1
1 (s(x
1,1)), . . . ,s(u1,p) = F
1
p (s(x
1,p))}.
Clearly, M |=Y1 Θ1 holds, thus we have that M |=Y1 δ2 holds (i.e., (4) holds).
So there exist functions
α2,1(F 1) : Y1 →M,.. . . . . ,α2,p(F 1) : Y1(α2,1/u2,1) . . . (α2,p−1/u2,p−1)→M
depending on F 1 such that M |=Y2 Θ2 and M |=Y2 δ3 holds (i.e., (5) holds), where
Y2 = Y1(α2,1/u2,1) . . . (α2,p/u2,p).
Now, we define functions F 21 (F 1), . . . ,F 2p (F 1) :M q→M , which simulate α2,1, . . . ,α2,p
as follows: for each 1 ≤ j ≤ p and for any d ∈M q, let
F 2j (d) = s(u2,j) for some s ∈ Y2 such that s(x2,j) = d.
Note that the definition of Y2 guarantees such s in the above definition always
exists, and moreover, each F 2j is well-defined since for any s,s′ ∈ Y2 with
s(x2,j) = d= s′(x2,j),
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as M |=Y2=(x
2,j ,u2,j), we must have that
s(u2,j) = s
′(u2,j).
Repeat the same argument and construction n− 1 times to define inductively
for any sequences of functions F 3,F 5, . . . ,F 2n−1, the subteams Y3 of Y2, . . . , Y2n
of Y2n−1 such that
M |=Y3 Θ3, M |=Y5 Θ5, . . . ,M |=Y2n−1 Θ2n−1,
and the supplement teams Y4,Y6, . . . ,Y2n satisfy
M |=Y4 Θ4, M |=Y6 Θ6, . . . ,M |=Y2n−2 Θ2n−2, M |=Y2n Θ2n∧ψ′,
and to define inductively the sequences of functions
F 4,F 6 . . . ,F 2n : M q →M,
according to the functions α4,α6, . . . ,α2n obtained from the existential quantifiers
∃u4,∃u6 . . . ,∃u2n. It then suffices to show that
(M,F 1, . . . ,F 2n) |= ∀xψ(f 1, . . . ,f 2n).
Let a be an arbitrary sequence in M of the same length as that of x. By the
construction of Y2n, there must exists s ∈ Y2n such that s(x) = a. Since M |=Y2n
ψ′, by downwards closure, we have that M |={s} ψ′. Note that by the definitions
of F 1, . . . ,F 2n, condition (2) in Lemma 5.6 is satisfied for each F ij , hence, an
application of Lemma 5.6 gives the desired result that
(M,F 1, . . . ,F 2n,s(x)) |= ψ(f 1, . . . ,f 2n,x).
Observe that in the sentence φ∗ in the proof of Theorem 5.7, the only subformu-
las that are not in the language of ID are dependence atoms with several variables
and first-order formulas, both of which are expressible in ID. Therefore we are able
to turn it into an equivalent ID sentence.
Theorem 5.8. SO sentences are expressible in ID.
Proof. Follows from Lemma 5.7, Lemma 3.1 and Theorem 3.4.
Finally, we arrive at the following theorem.
Theorem 5.9. SO sentences are expressible in ID, and vice versa.
Proof. Follows from Theorem 5.8 and 5.1.
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Remark 5.10. It is easy to observe that in the above translation, the intuitionistic
disjunction > did not play a role. In fact, > is definable in ID uniformly by the
expression φ>ψ ≡ θ1∧ θ2, where
θ1 := ∀x∀y(x= y)→ ((φ→⊥)→ ψ)
(which deals with the case that the model has only one element) and
θ2 := ∀x∃y(x= y→⊥)→∃w∃u
(
=(w)∧ =(u)∧ ((w = u)→ φ)
∧ ((w = u→⊥)→ ψ)
)
(which deals with the other cases).
Remark 5.11. In fact, Lemma 5.5 gives a normal form for Π12n (n ∈ ω) sentences,
therefore the ID sentences of the form in Theorem 5.8 can be viewed as ID normal
form for Π12n sentences. Moreover, using the “classical negation” of ID for sen-
tences, applying the same trick as that in the proof of Corollary 4.8, one can obtain
an ID normal form for Σ12n sentences φ, namely ψ∗ →⊥, for ψ∗ the translation of
the Π12n sentence ψ ≡ ¬φ.
Using the same trick as that in Lemma 5.5, one can also obtain a nice normal
form for Σ12n−1 sentences. Thus, the above observation (normal form) holds for
Σ12n−1 and Π12n−1 sentences as well. In particular, the proof of Theorem 4.6 (for Σ11
sentences) can then be viewed as a special case of the proof of Theorem 5.8.
6 Further Work
6.1 Expressive Power of ID Open Formulas
In this paper, we proved that the expressive power of sentences of ID is equiva-
lent to that of sentences of the full second order logic. In [8], it was proven that
with respect to nonempty teams, open formulas of D defines exactly those prop-
erties that are definable in Σ11 with an extra predicate, occurring only negatively,
for the nonempty teams. A similar result can be obtained for open formulas of ID,
that is with respect to nonempty teams, open formulas of ID defines exactly those
properties that are definable in the full second order logic with an extra predicate,
occurring only negatively, for the nonempty teams, see [14] for details.
6.2 Linear Dependence Logic
One other interesting fragment of BID-logic is the linear dependence logic (LD).
This is the fragment extended from dependence logic by adding the linear impli-
cation. More precisely, well-formed formulas of LD are formed by the following
rule
φ ::= α |=(t1, . . . , tn) | ¬=(t1, . . . , tn) | φ∧φ | φ⊗φ | φ⊸ φ | ∀xφ | ∃xφ
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where α is a first-order literal and t1, . . . , tn are terms. One may wonder whether
the translation discussed in this paper works for LD sentences. This is still unclear,
however, one has to realize in the first place that for LD sentences, the situation
is more complicated. Because, as pointed out in Section 2, LD does not have the
empty team property. For any sentence φ of BID-logic, we define the truth value
JφK of φ on a model M to be
JφK = {X |M |=X φ, X ∈ ℘(M
Fv(φ))}.
The failure of empty team property implies that for any LD sentence φ, the truth
value JφK lies in the three-element set {{{ /0}, /0},{ /0}, /0}, namely, LD is three-
valued (see [1] for more details).
One result we have obtained along this line is that the similar translation does
apply to the second order Π12 fragment and LD in the following sense. Let φ be a
Π12 sentence of the form described in Lemma 5.5 and φ∗ the sentence of BID-logic
defined in Lemma 5.7 which expresses φ. We replace the intuitionistic implication
→ in φ∗ by the linear implication⊸ and denote the resulting LD sentence by φ∗∗.
Then for any model M , the following is true:
M |= φ ⇐⇒ M |= /0 φ
∗∗.
This shows that sentences of LD goes beyond Σ11 already with respect to the truth
value /0 .
6.3 IF-logic and the Full Second Order Logic
It is well-known that Independence friendly logic is equivalent to Σ11, thus to D,
on the level of sentences. This indicates a possibility of obtaining the same result
of this paper for an extension of IF-logic. However, the result of this paper relies
heavily on the role the intuitionistic implication plays in the translation; that is, it
is based on a deep understanding of the general framework of Hodges’ team se-
mantics. Since the original semantics of IF-logic was given by means of imperfect
information games ([4]), to obtain the same result of this paper for a reasonable
extension of IF-logic, one may have to seek for a different notion, a game-theoretic
one, which corresponds to the intuitionistic implication in the team semantics con-
text.
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